IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
|
et al., A Person Coming
under the
Juvenile Court Law, __________ XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX, Petitioner, vs. Respondent, SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party at Interest, |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
SANTA CLARA CASE NO(S). JDXXXXXXX
AND JDXXXXXXX PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDATE AND PROHIBITION AND ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF DEEMED NECESSARY AND
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE EMERGENCY STAY REQUESTED |
The Honorable Leonard P. Edwards, Judge
XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX
xxxxxxx xxxxxx Drive
San Jose, CA 95xxx
(408) xxx-xxxx
Petitioner and Mother
In Propria Persona
I
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner and her children are presently
in a post-permanent plan hearing pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code § 366.30[1]
et seq. The present permanent plan
is long-term foster care. Petitioner filed a prior Writ/Petition for
Mandate/Prohibition filed before this Court on xxx xxx, 2001, in case No.
XXXXXc, herein after referred to as the petition of Xxxxxxx, 2001, and hereby
incorporated by reference herein (also see attached request for judicial
notice). The petition of Xxxxxxx, 2001, was denied by this Court Xxxxxxx1,
2001, with no explanation attached. This present writ/petition challenges the
following:
The
matter was set for status review hearing on Xxxxxxx, 2001, pursuant to § 366.30. At said status review
hearing, petitioner objected to the
continual failure of Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s
services[2],
social workers’ continued failure to provide
status review reports to petitioner in a timely manner and requested trial
court for a continuance of ten (10) days), so as to prepare and absorb said status review report.
The trial court granted said request. Petitioner requested a contested hearing
and that petitioner also requested the confidential placement foster mother
XXXXXXX be present, Mr. XXXXXXX, LCSW, LMFT, and DCFS social worker XXXXXXX be present at the hearing.
The trial court partially denied petitioner’s request by allowing only the
social worker to be present at continued-contested hearing. The stated that it did
not want any lengthy testimony and that no other witnesses be allowed to
testify nor any other witnesses be allowed to be cross-examined.
The foregoing actions of the trial
court have in effect denied the petitioner
effective participation in these proceedings by denying petitioner her right to
produce witnesses in her favor and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
to her or her children. (see petition filed Xxxxxxx, 2001).
On
Xxxxxxx1, 2001 at juvenile court hearing, the court for some unknown reason
changed its prior orders, the judge requested petitioner to file points and
authorities in support of her “entitlement” to a hearing and the scope and
nature of said requests. Respondent, social worker was not present, even though
ordered by the juvenile court to be present. Petitioner was given a deadline for
said pleadings of Xxxxxxx, 2001, with which
petitioner complied. (see Exhibit “1 & 2”). Respondent juvenile court ordered
respondent, real party in interest, DFCS to respond to petitioner’s pleadings by June 1,
2001. To date petitioner has never been served with any such response. The court set the matter for “settlement
conference” to occur on
June 18, 2001.
On
June 18, 2001, at settlement conference, DFCS is real
party in interest, social worker and county counsel’s only offer was to
return to the social worker complete discretion for visitation. Petitioner refused the offer based on the
current social worker’s continued and documented misrepresentations,
manipulations and cruel statements used on the minor children.
At
settlement conference petitioner served on all parties a request for discovery
(see Exhibit “3”) and a witness list
(see Exhibit “4”). The juvenile court ordered that the
contested hearing would be “limited to issues of visitation only” concerning
the Minor Xxxxxxxxx B., and that the only testimony allowed would be by the
children’s therapist, Mr. XXXXXXX, LCSW, LMFT and the present social worker,
XXXXXXX. Further, the juvenile court limited petitioner’s discovery to
documents, notes and reports from within the last ninety days of DFCS records and
excluded all other witnesses, even with the offers of proof provided to the juvenile
court (see Exhibit(s) “1-7”, of the
manipulation and misrepresentations of the social worker and that petitioner
could amply prove that the causes of the placement of her children in foster
care have been mitigated or alleviated. (see Exhibit “D” within Exhibit “1”).
In
furtherance of the misrepresentations and manipulations of this social worker
at said hearing, stated, “the father has authorized the trip”. This not true. (see Exhibit
“5”, declaration of Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx, the children’s father, who was seriously
ill and in the hospital, he was not present at the settlement conference). This
issue concerns the children going on a vacation trip with the foster parents
via automobile to New York State. Approval was heartily advocated by the social
worker for this trip, and knowing full well that the foster mother was
diagnosed with lung cancer and waiting pending approval for the trip by the
foster mother's doctor.
Petitioner made numerous objections
to the foregoing as an in pro per litigant. Petitioner continually cited §
366.30(e), verbally reading this section to an already procedurally deaf court.
Petitioner also cited In re Kelly D. (2000), 82 Cal.App.4th 433, in
regards to a parent’s rights and expectations
in a § 366.30 proceeding. In all appearances
the juvenile court acted prejudicially towards petitioner and acted not as a
neutral trier of fact, but as an arm of the agency, DFCS, Santa Clara
County. The juvenile court is limiting
the petitioner’s participation and as a result is limiting the record so as to endorse the present and past illegal practices of DFCS and
its social workers, thus, not just constituting a miscarriage of justice, but
obstruction of justice, a felony under California law.
Petitioner
has no adequate, plan or remedy at her disposal to rectify this miscarriage of
justice and prejudicial error created by the lack of procedural due process in
the trial court, except by stay of this Court and issuance of this
writ/petition.
II
PETITION
1. I
am the Petitioner), XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX and the defendant and mother of XXXXXXXXX and
XXXXXXX B. in juvenile court proceedings initiated pursuant to § 300 et seq. and has been involved in
with the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services and
their guardian ad litem said social worker, the real party at interest herein.
2. Respondent
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, is the court
where the juvenile dependency law action is pending in case numbers JDXXXXXXX
& JDXXXXXXX.
3. Xxxxxxxxx
and Xxxxxxx B. are my natural children.
My daughter Xxxxxxxxx was born on Xxxxxxx6, 1992, and is now nine (9)
years old. My daughter Xxxxxxx was born
on March 24, 1991, and is now ten (10) years old.
4. The initial
removal date, for both girls and their two (2) brothers, was xxxxxx, 1998. The initial detention order was September 1,
1998 and the Jurisdiction Finding and Dispositional order, were on September
22, 1998.
5. On Xxxxxxx,
2001, at a § 366.30 Status Review Hearing Petitioner objected to being served
with the social worker’s Status Review Report, immediately
prior to hearing, as has been the social worker’s continuing pattern. The court continued the matter for the
requisite ten (10) days service requirement.
It was continued to Xxxxxxx1, 2001 then
scheduled to a § 366.30. The judge also
tried to “bully” me into taking a court appointed attorney.
6. On Xxxxxxx,
2001, petitioner filed before this Court of Appeal, a writ/petition of
mandate/prohibition in regards to almost the same issues in case no. XXXXXXX.
Except, not only do we have denial of procedural due process, we now have the
trial court acting as an umbrella of protection of the social worker and her
agency, DFCS, through its actions resulting in judicial misconduct and
obstruction of justice.
7. Petitioner’s
writ/petition of mandate/prohibition in case No. XXXXXXX was denied by this
Court.
8. On
Xxxxxxx1, 2001, at the § 366.30
Status Review Hearing, Petitioner was informed, by the respondent court, once that she had a right
to an attorney. The petitioner
respectfully declined and requested a contested hearing. The juvenile court judge
made it very clear that he had not read the items filed by the
Petitioner that morning, Respondent/Mother’s Response to Social Worker’s Status
Review Report and Recommendations, see Exhibit
“6”. The judge asked how long it
would take for the petitioner to file Points and Authorities in Support of
Right to Contested Hearing and to Cross-Examine Adverse witnesses and produce
witnesses and argue her case and required that
Respondent/ prove her entitlement to a contested
hearing and the scope of said hearing and attached points and authorities in
support thereof. The judge wanted to
know how long I needed. I told him I
could have it quite quickly. I said that it basically
boiled down to In re Kelly D. supra, and that the judge
basically had already received what he requested, that morning. First he gave petitioner until the 18th
of May 2001 and then changed it to the xxxx of
May. He asked County Counsel how long
they needed. County Counsel stated they
needed a couple of weeks. Judge Edwards gave respondents until the 1st
of June 2001. A settlement conference
was set for June 18th, 2001 at 8:30 am, and the contested hearing
was set for June 25th, 2001. The court once again ordered that the social worker,
Xxxxxxx be present, as well as
Mr. XXXXXXX, who is the children's (court appointed
therapist). All other witnesses
were denied.
9.
On June 18, 2001, Petitioner
filed a request of Discovery (see Exhibit
“3”) and a more detailed witness
list (see Exhibit “4”) It
was obvious that the juvenile court had already made up its mind even, before I
had a chance to argue my points. The
social worker had presented a letter from Mr. Xxxxxxx,
the children’s therapist, dated April 26, 2001.
The juvenile court ordered that Mr.
Sala be present at the next hearing and that the social worker be
present as well. The judge denied any other witnesses inclusive of the foster mother, who was explicitly named in the social
worker's report. (see Exhibit ”7”) When the petitioner questioned the judge
about this, the judge informed petitioner that
the only issue that would be dealt with, is the issue of visitation. When the petitioner questioned the juvenile
court about it, asking if this wasn’t to be the requested contested § 366.30
hearing, the juvenile court told petitioner yes, but all he will hear is in
regards to Xxxxxxxxx and
visitation. The petitioner asked, when
petitioner should expect to have the contested § 366.30
hearing, the judge restated that was
all he was going to hear. Petitioner asked when she should expect the rest of the
requested discovery, and the court reiterated
that I could expect 90 day’s worth by Friday, but as for the rest the court
didn’t know. He did order the social
worker to start getting it together. He
refused to set any time restraint on the full discovery and refused the
petitioner her right to effectively participate in these proceedings, and
basically adjusted the hearing to suit what he wanted with little to no regards
to §
366.30(e) or to In re Kelly D., supra. Petitioner made numerous objections over the foregoing issues. All
discovery of records
more than ninety days old and not relevant to visitation was denied.
10.
Petitioner contacted her former husband, Joseph V.
Xxxxxxxxx, the children’s father, subsequent
to the aforementioned hearing about the
statement that the social worker made concerning the
father's approval of the trip with our children to xxxxxxx. He stated to
me, “That is not what I stated to the social
worker." Here
again was continued
manipulation and misrepresentation by said social worker and in all actuality
fraud, not only being perpetrated against the juvenile court but also the
children that the social worker has a fiduciary responsibility to, as their
guardian at litem.
11.
Because of the emergency situation in this matter, the
official transcripts could not be submitted in that there is not ample time to
obtain the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts.
Related documentation is attached.
III
PRAYER
WEREFORE, petitioner prays that the
Honorable Presiding Justice and the Honorable Associate Justices of this Court
of Appeal, grant and issue this writ/petition for good cause showing and that
any further relief requested be granted and that any relief this Court deems
necessary.
IV
VERIFICATION
I, XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX, declare as
follows:
I, am the petitioner and mother of said
minor children herein, that I have constructed, created and produced this
petition/writ and know its contents. The facts in this petition are true in
this petition to my own knowledge and if called to testify to same, I, could and
would.
I, declare under penalty of perjury under
the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct and
that this verification was executed on xxxxxx, 2001, at San Jose California in
the County of Santa Clara.
___________________________
XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX
Petitioner In Propria Persona
V
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
A.
PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVELY
PARTICIPATE IN § 366.30 HEARING INCLUSIVE
OF A CONTESTED HEARING AND THE RIGHT TO
CROSS-EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES AND THE
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS AND A DENIAL OF SAME IS A MISCARRIAGE
OF JUSTICE AND REVERSABLE UPON THIS COURTS ORDER
The trial
court’s denial of petitioner’s right to full and effective participation in
these proceedings constitutes a miscarriage of justice. See In re Kelly D. (2000), 82 Cal.App.4th
433. The Third District Court of Appeals held that:
“subdivision (e) of section 366.3 expressly
entitles the parents of a minor in long-term foster care to notice of and participation in the six-month status
review hearing. "Notice" of that hearing must include notice to
the parent of any proposed departmental modifications to existing juvenile
court orders. Moreover, to "participate"
in the hearing connotes involvement as a party to the proceeding, one
essential aspect of which is the reasonable expectation that parents could
challenge departmental proposals and proposed court modifications”…
“366.3 does not mention visitation, visits are a
service pertaining only to the minor. First, although visits are not addressed
explicitly in the statute, from other language in subdivision (e) one must
infer that visitation is a proper issue to address at the hearing, and that it
pertains to parental interests as well as those of the minor. For example,
under the express terms of the statute, the juvenile court must review the
adequacy of services provided to the minor, consider the minor's safety, and
assess the progress the parents have made toward mitigating the causes
necessitating placement in foster care. (§ 366.3, subd. (e).)”…
“In Relying on the express terms of section 366.3
and principles of procedural due process, appellant contends he was entitled to
notice and a contested status review hearing”…
Petitioner
argues that, if allowed to proceed with full participation, [a]t the hearing,
petitioner would be able to present evidence to show that over-night
visitations were beneficial to the child, not detrimental. In re Kelly D. Supra.,
did not limit the participation of the parents to just visitation, as the
juvenile court erroneously determined. Further petitioner amply proved through
offer’s of proof that the trial court would then be able to make an informed
decision on whether it should re-institute reunification services in Xxxxxxxxx
B.’s case, and prove the present social worker has misrepresented and
manipulated the truth to all parties and persons directly involved in this
matter, but, without being allowed to produce both adverse and non-adverse
witnesses petitioner will not be able to effectively participate in these
proceedings.
The
Kelly D., supra, Court further held:
“In determining the proper scope of section 366.3, our primary task is to determine
legislative intent. In order to do so, we must begin with the wording of the
statute itself. (Brown v. Kelly
Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724.) Where the language of the statute
is clear, there is no need to resort to other indicia of legislative intent; no
need for construction then exists. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727,
735; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198.) Moreover, every
word, phrase and provision employed in a statute is intended to have meaning
and to perform a useful function. fn. 3 (Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954)
43 Cal.2d 227, 233.)
As appellant has argued, subdivision (e) of
section 366.3 expressly entitles the parents of a minor in long-term foster
care to notice of and participation in the six-month status review
hearing. "Notice"
of that hearing must include notice to the parent of any proposed departmental
modifications to existing juvenile court orders. Moreover, to "participate" in the hearing connotes
involvement as a party to the proceeding, one essential aspect of which is the
reasonable expectation that parents could challenge departmental proposals
and proposed court modifications…”
“…For example, under the express terms of the
statute, the juvenile court must review the adequacy of services provided to
the minor, consider the minor's safety, and assess the progress the parents
have made toward mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care.
(§ 366.3, subd. (e).)…” [emphasis added].
“…It is true that, by the time the juvenile court
conducts a status review hearing, the minor is in a placement other than with
the parents. However, that situation is not necessarily a permanent
one. As subdivision (e) provides, a
parent has the opportunity to demonstrate that additional efforts at
reunification will promote the best interests of the minor. In such a case, the
court may order further reunification services for the parent. (§ 366.3, subd.
(e).) Thus, it is possible that parent and child could be reunited.”… “Legislature has made its intention clear.
As we have seen, subdivision (e) of section 366.3 confers on a parent the right
to "participate" in the hearing, a right which, we have suggested,
has little meaning or content if it does not include the right to challenge or
contest a proposed order”… “Review hearings are a critical aspect of our
state's dependency system. We recognize the expeditious resolution of these
proceedings is an essential goal of that system. But the Legislature has decided that accommodating the wishes of, and, indeed,
rights of parents to attempt to reestablish the parents' relationship with a
child is a vital objective as well”… “In this case, appellant sought a contested hearing on the issue of
the frequency of his visitation with the minors. We conclude that, pursuant to
the express language of subdivision (e) of section 366.3, he is entitled to
that hearing. The juvenile court's failure to comply with appellant's request
resulted in a miscarriage of justice under the circumstances here. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13.)”… “On remand, the court must conduct another review
hearing, pursuant to section 366.3, and consistent
with the principles expressed in this opinion”… “At the hearing, appellant has the right to testify and otherwise
submit evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and argue his case”…
[emphasis added]. “The order reducing
the frequency of appellant's visitation with the minors is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the juvenile court, which shall conduct a contested
hearing on the proposal by HSD to modify appellant's visitation”…
Petitioner
objected many times to her being denied her right to demonstrate through
witnesses that six more months of reunification services are in the best
interest of her child Xxxxxxxxx B. and that the causes of the children being
placed in foster care have been mitigated or alleviated. The offers of proof,
from known experts, presented both presently and prior, more than adequately
indicates good cause for witness and a hearing on the merits.
Therefore
the trial court’s actions in the denial of the process do, constitutes a
miscarriage of justice, and further questionable actions of the juvenile court
gives rise to judicial misconduct or obstruction of justice and a stay of
proceedings is appropriate and this writ/petition should issue in the best interests
of justice and a little girl who wants to come home (see Exhibit “C” within Exhibit “6”).
B.
THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS
PETITION ARE OF BROAD PUBLIC
CONCERN AND PUBLIC SAFETY AND
REQUIRES THE CLOSE SCRUTINEY
OF THIS COURT OF APPEAL
Based on this
self-serving actions of respondents. This case reveals the strong indication
that the respondents violated petitioners’ due process rights. By limiting
petitioners’ adversarial ability to effectively challenge the department, in
violation of the due process clause of the XIV
Amendment, and contrary to the purpose of juvenile court law. See In re Daniela M. (1992), 15 Cal.App.4th
421; 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 290.
Further,
the actions of the respondents give rise to issues of public concern and public
safety, in that, beyond questions of due process and parental rights, looms the
question of judicial and official misconduct. There is a strong public
interest in ascertaining the truth in judicial proceedings. People v. Granish (1996), 41 Cal.App.4th
1117, 1126. There is a strong
public interest in the accurate reporting of judicial proceedings. Franklin v. Benevolent Order of Elks (1979), 97 Cal.App.3d 915, 929. There is a strong public interest in
preserving the integrity of the judicial truth-seeking process. Rinaker v. Superior Court (1998), 62
Cal.App. 4th 155, 167 fn.5.
The public has an interest in the fair and efficient administration of
justice. People v. Gonzales (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 1744, 1757[3].
Based on the present social workers manipulations and misrepresentations caused
the minor child, Xxxxxxxxx not to be returned home, and when all is said and
done, this official sloppiness - whether malicious or merely negligent - wasted
a whole lot of the public’s time and money.
There is a strong public interest in saving public monies. Neary v. Regents of University of California
(1992), 2 Cal.4th 273, 283.
Some of the very same issues in the very
same matter are being revisited again by this court, because an unlawful and
consistent pattern of abuses by respondents. Petitioner in her pleadings
clearly argued the law, § 366.30 and
the only citing under that statute, In
re Kelly D., Supre, as well as
the petitioners’ right to discovery, both as a party and as her own counsel.
The juvenile courts’ continued efforts to evade and ignore both the statute
that applies and the only decisional law under that statute, the only binding
president, creates a question as to it’s jurisdiction to do so. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962), 57 Cal.App.2d 450, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321.
In
essence the juvenile court overruled statute, the legislature and their intent
pursuant to the express language of §
366.30(e), and to intensify this petitioner argued the only interpretation
of the statute In re Kelly D. Supra. Coupled with offers of proof,
this is far in excess of the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction and therefore
reversible.
The
foregoing are serious issues of great public concern, that need to be resolved,
in order to maintain public trust in the judiciary and public agencies as DFCS,
that requires the issuance of this petition in order to obtain a goal of public
confidence, trust and safety.
VI
THE JUVENILE COURT’S DENIAL
OF REQUSTED DISCOVERY IS
PREDJUDICIAL
ERROR AND IS REVERSABLE UPON
THIS COURTS ORDER
The
juvenile court’s order denying petitioner full disclosure and discovery is
prejudicial error in light of the evidence produced in petitioner’s pleadings
and arguments resulting in many objections to the juvenile court’s orders, in
regards to the social worker’s present and prior acts of manipulations and
misrepresentations. Petitioner further questions the courts ruling in light of Rule 1420(d)[4]
which states:
“(d) [Material and information to be disclosed
on request] Except as provided in subdivisions (g) and (g), petitioner
shall, upon timely request, disclose to the child and parent or guardian, or
their counsel, the following material and information within the petitioner’s
possession or control:
(1)
Probation reports prepared in connection with the pending matter
relating to the child, parent, or guardian;
(2)
Records of statements, admissions, or conversations by the child,
parent of guardian;
(3)
Records of statements, admissions, or conversations by any alleged
coparticipant;
(4)
Names and addresses of witnesses interviewed by an investigating
authority in connection with the pending matter;
(5)
Records of statements or conversations of witnesses or other persons
interviewed by an investigating authority in connection with the pending
matter;
(6)
Reports or statements of experts made regarding the pending matter,
including results of physical or mental examinations and results of scientific
tests, experiments, or comparisons;
(7)
Photographs or physical evidence relating to the pending matter;
(8)
Records of prior felony convictions of the witnesses each party intends
to call.”
One
can only surmise why such a denial of discovery, but coupled with the evidence
produced, one can only adduce that the denial was to keep petitioner from
discovering any further manipulations and misrepresentations of the present and
past social workers. This would then constitute a further obstruction of
justice, in that the resulting actions of the social worker are acts of either
“extrinsic fraud” or “conspiracy” on either point it is criminalistic in
nature, the order denying petitioner discovery results in prejudice to
petitioner and limits her right to effectively participate in these
proceedings. See In re Kelly D., Supra; Rule 1420(d); § 827(a)(1)(D)& (E); In the opinion of the
Attorney General of this State, which states:
“Reports prepared by county welfare
department in dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code, §
827, be inspected by council representing the parent or guardian in the
dependency proceedings. Any document
made available to a welfare department social worker department social worker
in making his report, which is thereafter retained by the department, may be
inspected pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, § 827, by council
representing the parent or guardian in the dependency proceedings…”
62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.634
Petitioner
is not only party to these proceedings, but is acting as her own counsel, In
pro per. Further the principal of confidentiality of juvenile court records and
proceedings must give way, where it conflicts with defendant’s rights, to
cross- examination and confrontations (see Foster
v. Superior Court (1980), 107 Cal.App3d 218; 165 Cal.Rptr. 701).
Further
it was held in § 388 proceedings
that:
“…rule 1432(f). That rule is not absolute and does not override due
process considerations (see Los Angeles County Dept. of Children etc. Services
v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1305-1306 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].)”
as cited
in, In re Matthew P. (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 841,851.
The
acts and resulting orders of juvenile court limiting discovery were derived
without good cause and questionable motive, and the resulting effects have
greatly diminished petitioner’s rights effective participation in these
proceedings thus resulting, at a minimum “prejudicial error” and orders in
excess of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, reversible upon this Court’s
needed order.
VII
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing in that good cause
showing this Court should order an emergency stay of proceedings and this writ
should issue, this is the only way to prevent a miscarriage of justice that
would prejudice petitioner and would in effect cause detriment to petitioner’s
minor children who’s best interest should be of concern to all.
VIII
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Pursuant to California Evidence Code § 451 subdivision (a), Petitioner, XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX, respectfully requests that the Honorable Presiding Justice and the Honorable Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals take judicial notice of petitioners prior writ/petition for mandate and prohibition filed before this court on Xxxxxxx, 2001 and denied on Xxxxxxx1, 2001, in case no. XXXXXXX in regards to Santa Clara County Superior Court case number(s) JDXXXXXXX and JDXXXXXXX. Appellant also requests that this Court take judicial notice of any and all other records and documents contained therein, in the aforesaid action, which were before this Court.
These documents may be judicially noticed
under California Evidence Code § 452, subdivision (d), as records of a
court of this State. All indicated records are relevant to this instant matter.
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[1] All further references to Statute will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
[2] Herein after referred to as DFCS.
[3] There is a public interest in the safety and welfare of jailed inmates. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2000), 82 Cal.App.4th 819, 835. If so, the safety and welfare of children and families should be of equal or greater public interest. In this case, child safety and welfare are clearly implicated, since - through unfair, improper and possibly corrupt process - the Petitioner has limited in a process already determined to be due-Kelly D. Supra., If this petition is dismissed it will only serve to encourage this and all other Counties and courts to perform the same acts violating public trust and safety and by review of this Court is the only way of preventing this sort of thing from happening again.
[4] Any further reference to Rules are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise specified.