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Attorney at Law

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xxxxxxxxx, Ca xxxxx

Superior Court of the State of California

For the County of xxxxxxxxxxxx

Juvenile Division

IN THE MATTER(S) OF: Juvenile Case No(s)

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, DOB xxxxxxxxx ) JD

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, DOB xxxxxxxx ) JD

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, DOB xxxxxxxx ) JD

xxxxxxxxxx DOB xxxxxxxxx ) JD

) Department xx

) MOTION AND ORDER TO

Juveniles ) DISMISS

PURSUANT TO W&I SECT. 352

IN PRO PER

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

IN SUPPORT OF THE PARENT’S RIGHT TO A

JURY TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

(1) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IS EXPLICIT AS TO THE INVIOLATE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN EITHER CRINIMAL OR CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

(1) PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE FAR MORE PRECIOUS THAN PROPERTY RIGHTS

(1) WHETHER A JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDING IS A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PROCEEDING?

(1) A JUVENILE COURT DEPENCENCY PROCEEDING IS MORE NEARLY CRIMINAL THAN CIVIL IN SUBSTANCE AND CONSEQUENCE

(1) BY A VAST PREPONDERANCE OF LEGAL TESTS THE JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDING IS SHOWN TO BE A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

(1) CONCLUSION

(2)

(3)

(4)

I.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IS EXPLICIT AS TO THE INVIOLATE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN EITHER CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.

(1) The constitution of the state of California at Article I, section. 16, secures to all persons the right to a trial by jury in both civil and criminal proceedings. Pursuant to Article I, section 26 of the Constitution of the State of California it is mandatory that trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. Ita lex scripta est.

(1) Article I, section 16 of the Constitution of the State of California declares:

Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict. A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel. In a civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as prescribed by statute.

(1) Article 1, section 24 of the constitution of the State of California declares:

Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

This declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.

(1) Article I, section 26 of the Constitution of the State of California declares:

The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.

(1) It is a well-established rule that constitutional provisions that are complete in themselves, clear and without ambiguity are self-executing and controlling, Western P.R. Co. v. Godfrey 166 C 343 (1913). Unless a contrary intent is expressed, the words utilized in a constitutional provision must be understood to indicate the meaning that they bear in ordinary usage among the people, County of Los Angeles v. State of California 43 C 3d 46 (1987); San Francisco v. McGovern 28 CA 491 (1915). Of equal importance, Article I, section 24 makes it clear that “this declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”

(6) Article Isection 26 of the California Constitution makes it clear that the provisions of Article I, section 16 are mandatory. Since no exceptions are expressed concerning the inviolate right to a trial by jury, the rule that constitutional provisions are mandatory must be regarded as controlling, McDonald v Patterson 54 C 245 (1880); Navajo Mining and Development Co. v. Curry 147 C 581 (1905).

I. Parental rights are far more precious than property rights

(7) Equal protection of the law and the requirements of fair procedure and substantial justice demand that parental rights be protected by rigorous due process. The U.S. Supremem Court has acknowledged that parental rights are “rights far more precious than property rights”, May v. Anderson 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953), and the right to parent is also recognized as among the “…basic civil rights of man”, Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

(8) In Parham v. J.R. 422 U.S. 584 (1979) the U.S. Supreme Court wisely observed that:

As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. ‘That some parents may at times be acting against the interests of their child’ creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests….. The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.

Thus, parental rights are secured by the Constitution of the United States of America and , we assert, by the California Constitution-and thereby enjoy the protections of the highest standards of due process of law. And, when the government seeks to intrude into family life or otherwise interferes with the parent-child bond, the government’s actions must be subject to strict scrutiny and the parents must NOT be denied due process of law because their status as parents minor children.

(8) The petitioner in the instant case offer the folowing syllogism as true:

If property rights enjoy the protection of the right to a trial by jury, and parental rights are Far More precious than property rights, then parental rights also enjoy the protection of the right to a trial by jury.

Clearly, government intrusion into the parent-child relationship can portend much more than a petty annoyance or “benevolent” inconvenience. Such government intrusion may approximate or even exceed the most sever of criminal penalties.

For example, under California law, the state may permanently terminate parental rights ( WIC 366.26). As a consequence, the parents can lose not only the care,custody and companionship of their child, but , perhaps their only heir. Such a termination of parental rights may this effectively and forever end a family lineage.

(8) The parent-child relationship embodies all that may be characterized as life, libery, propery, and the pursuit of happiness. Those certain inalienable rights must include:

Not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at comon law as essentail to the oederly pursuit of happiness by free men. Meyer b Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 67 L.ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. at 626.

Indeed, the federal judiciary has found the rights of parents to be located in several of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Unsited States of America:

Amendment One (freedom of association)

Amendment Two (primary and home security)

Amendment Four (due process of law)

Amendment nine (penumbra of rights reserved to

the people)

Amendment Fourteen (equal protection of the law)

The preeminent cases which are in accord with these principles are: Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Meyers b Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923);Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928);Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.

344 (1978); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

(8) It is here asserted that parental rights are secured by and enjoy equal protection under both the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of California . As all persons in the State of California enjoy the right to trial by jury in both civil and criminal proceedings, the parents of minor children likewise must be equally protected.

(8) Parents whose minor children are the subjects of juvenile court dependency proceeding are entitled, as a matter of constitutional right, to have the facts determined at trial by jury. . THERE IS NO CASE AUTHORITY OR STATUTORY LAW PERMITING THE DENIAL OF THIS RIGHT.

(8) Case law pertaining to juvenile defendants must be ditinguished from the case at hand. The issue(s) involved in the case law pertinent to the rights of juveniles are clearly not comparable to the rights of adults. Hence, the decisions of the courts at McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528 (1971), Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal 3d 370 (1971), In re Daedler, 194 Cal 320 (1924), and In re T.R.S. I Cal App 3d 178 (1969), do not dispose of the issue of the constitutional rights of parents in the juvenile court.

I. WHETHER A JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDING IS A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PORCEEDING?

(8) A California court has similarly framed the issue. In the case of In re Donna A,:

The crucial issue here, the, is not the fact that Dolly is a child, but whether a dependency proceeding is civil or criminal in nature. The answer to that question turns upon whether we view a dependency action from the vantage point of the parent or that of the child. There is authority for the view that a dependency proceeding is a ‘true civil cause, comparable in essentials to a child custody controversy between parents, except that the controversy is not between parents but one between a parent (or parents) and the state as parents patria.’ (In re Robinson (1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d 783,786 (87 Cal. Rptr. 678); cert. Den. Sub nom Kaufman v. Carter, (1971) 402 U.S. 964 (29 I. Ed. 2d 128, 91 A. Ct. 1624) The Robinson court adopts in essence, the view of the child for whom the question of custody is truly civil.

However, from the vantage point of the parent, especially a parent who is facing the loss of future contact with his child becaue of the alleged ‘depravity’ of his own behavior, the dependency proceeding is more nearly criminal in nature. ‘In most dependency matters the focus against the parent and the prospect faced is the drastic result of loss of his child. Although legal scholars may de-emphasize the adversary nature of dependency proceedings and characterize the removal of the child from parental custody as non-punitive action in the best interests of the child, most parents would view the loss of custody as dire punishment.’ Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901 (97 Cal. Rptr. 158.)

Here, defendant faced not only loss of custody of Dolly, but also criminal charges, both punitive actions arising from the same alleged acts of molestation…The dependency proceeding was, in this instance, more nearly criminal than civil. ( In re Donna A., supra. At 202,203.)

The Donna A. courts conclusion is cogent and it’s reasoning is persuasive. Most parents will indeed view the loss of custody of their child as “dire punishment”. Losing one’s child is certainly a punishment, which has life long consequences for the family, the parents, and the child.

(8) The Donna A. court is correct in rejecting the case authority that views a dependency proceeding as “comparable in essentials to a child custody controversy between parents” (Donna A. supra. At 202). First, it should not be presumed that a minor child will look favorably upon the intrusion of the state into his/her family. This is especially true where the state is reacting to a false allegation or over reacting to a minor complaint, eg normal parent-child conflict. A minor child faces the undesirable and highly probable situation of being forced into the dangerous and dehumanizing world of the state’s institutional or foster custody, complete loss of contact with his/her entire natural family, including siblings and grandparents , and the consequent loss of his/her family lineage, history and inheritance.

(16) Second, the juvenile court dependency proceeding is not “in essentials” similar (Donna A. supra. At 202) to a civil custody proceeding because the minor “child is not the mere creature of the state”, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 570, 535 (1925). The state is not the biological progenitor of the child. The state has no right to custody of the child in either natural law, the social contract, or by consent of the governed. The state’s interest in the child is merely legalistic and extends only while the minor child is legally a minor. Conversely the right and interest of the parents is biological, familial, multigenerational, and natural. The parents’ interest in their child extends beyond minority of the child, indeed, it extends beyond their own natural lives to all the generations of their family yet to be born. A parents interest in his or her natural child precedes, transcends and endures the establishment of civil government.

(17) Third, a contest between the state and a citizen is not a contest between equals. It is a contest between the leviathan and the individual.. The state, in a juvenile court dependency proceeding, possesses nearly limitless resources that no parent, no family can ever match. Ad in a criminal proceeding, the power, the expertise, the knowledge, and the institutional routines of the state are all focused against the parent whose child is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding. In the face of such power, a parent can offer little effective resistance. And, the situation is all the more desperate and grim for the family since the state may be holding the minor child as a virtual hostage. Few, if any, child custody disputes between parents are characterized by such a complete lack of balance in power.

I. A JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDING IS MORE NEARLY CRIMINAL THAN CIVIL IN SUBSTANCE AND CONSEQUENCE

(17) Since the Donna A. courts decision in 1986 the California State Legislature has revised the W&I code section 300 (Persons Subject to Jurisdiction) This revision effective January 1989 results in statutory law which is clearly focused upon the acts or behavior of the parents and consequently results in a juvenile court dependency proceeding which is “more nearly criminal than civil”, (Donna A., supra. At. 203) The W&I section 300 states in pertinent part:

(a) The minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally upon the minor by the minor's parent or guardian. For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on: the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated infliction’s of injuries on the minor or the minor's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm. For purposes of this subdivision, "serious physical harm" does not include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks where there is no evidence of serious physical injury. (b) The minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the minor, or the willful or negligent failure of the minor's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the minor from the conduct of the custodian with whom the minor has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the minor with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the minor due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. (c) The minor is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care. (d) The minor has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will be sexually abused, as defined in Section11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the minor from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was in danger of sexual abuse. (e) The minor is under the age of five and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the minor. (f) The minor's parent or guardian caused the death of another minor through abuse or neglect. (g) The minor has been left without any provision for support; the minor's parent has been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the minor; or a relative or other adult custodian with whom the minor resides or has been left is unwilling or unable to provide care or support for the minor, the where abouts of the parent is unknown, and reasonable efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful. (h) The minor has been freed for adoption by one or both parents for 12 months by either relinquishment or termination of parental rights or an adoption petition has not been granted. (i) The minor has been subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the minor from an act or acts of cruelty when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was in danger of being subjected to an act or acts of cruelty. (j) The minor's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the minor will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.

AS the foregoing illustrates it is the parents’ alleged guilty acts, omissions or quilt knowledge upon which the juvenile court will render its verdict.

(19) The California Rules of Court at Rule 1449 (c) (admissions of allegations; pre-requisitions to acceptance) make it clear that it is the parent who is on trial. Rule 1449 (c) states:

The court shall then inquire whether

the parent or guardian intends to admit or deny the allegations of the petition. If the parent or guardian neither admits nor denies the allegations, the court shall state on the record that the parent or guardian does not admit the allegations. If the parent or guardian wishes to admit the allegations, the court shall first find and state on the record, that it is satisfied that the parent or guardian understands the nature of the allegations and the direct consequences of the admission, and understands and waives the rights in subdivision (b).

(20) Likewise, California Rules of Court at 1449 (f) state in pertinent part:

(4) 4 The parent or guardian understands the nature of the conduct alleged in the petition and the

(5) possible consequences of an admission, plea of no contest, or submission;

(4) 5 The admission, plea of no contest, or submission by the parent or guardian is freely and voluntarily made;

(4) 6 There is a factual basis for the parent or guardian's admission;

(4) Those allegations of the petition as admitted are true as alleged;

While these sections of law- W&I 300 and Rule 1449-are prima facie evidence that, in fact, it is the actus reus of the parent that is on trial. Rule 1449 (f) (3) provides that the court shall advise the parent(s) of “the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination” (emphasis added). This is also compelling evidence that the juvenile court dependency proceeding is criminal in nature.

(21) The parents of a child adjudicated dependent of the juvenile court are subject to severe, costly and almost unlimited deprivation of their life, liberty and property. For example, W&I 370 provides that the parents may be placed under the supervision of a probation officer; W&I 361 (a) permits a court to limit the parental control of a child; W&I 361.5 (a) permits a court to order the parents to submit to “treatment”. Furthermore, W&I 364 (c), W&I 366.21 (e) and (f) direct a court to consider “the failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court-ordered treatment” as prima facie evidence that the return of their child<to the parents> would be detrimental. To add insult to injury, the parents are responsible for all costs such as foster or institutional custody, appointment of counsel for the minor, “expert” witnesses, etc, according to W&I 903 et.seq.

I. BY A VAST PREPONDERANCE OF LEGAL TESTS THE JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDING IS SHOWN TO BE A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

(21) The U.S. Supreme Court has looked to the potential maximum authorized penalty possible in criminal cases when analyzing the application of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 159-161. In Baldwin v. New York the court stated:

Indeed we long ago declared that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is not to be construed as relating only to felonies, or offenses punishable by confinement in the penitentiary. It embraces as well some classes of misdemeanors, the punishment of which involves or may involve the deprivation of the liberty of the citizen. (Citing Callen v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549, 32 L. Ed 223, 226, 8 S. Ct 1301(1888);Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 26, L. Ed.2d 437 at 441 (1886) ).

(21) The U.S. Supreme Court has often had occasion to consider whether or not an Act of Congress is punitive (criminal) or regulatory (civil) in character and effect. In doing so, the Court has developed and applied several tests. Consequently, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (272 U.S. 168, 83 S. Ct. 554 at 567 (1963)) the Court listed some of these tests as: ‘whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint’ <citing at note 22 Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 377, 18 L. Ed. 366; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316, 66 S. Ct. 1073,1079; Fleming v.Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S. Ct 1367,1376); “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment’ (Citing at note 23 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall, 277, 320-321, 18 L. Ed. 356; Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-429, 5 S. Ct. 935, 939-941, 29 L. Ed. 89; Mackin v. Untied States, 117 U.S. 348, 350-352, 6 S. Ct. 777, 778, 27 L. Ed. 909; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-238, 16 S. Ct. 977, 981, 41 L. Ed. 140. Text omitted); ‘whether it comes into play only upon finding scienter” (citing at note 24 Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-612, 23 S. Ct. 427, 428-429, 47 L. Ed. 614; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37-38, 42 S. Ct. 449, 450-451, 66 L. Ed. 817);

“whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution and deterrence” (citing at note 23 United States v. Constantine 296 U.S. 287, 295, 56 S Ct. 223, 227, 80 L. Ed 233; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 96,78 S. Ct at 595 (opinion of the Chief Justice); is at 111-112, 78 S. Ct., at 603 (Brennan, J., concurring); “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime (citing at note 26 Lipke v. Leduce, 259 U.S. 557, 562, 42 S. Ct. 549, 551, 66 L. Ed. 1061; Untied States v La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-573, 51 S. Ct 278, 280, 75 L. Ed. 551; Untied States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 295, 56 S. Ct., at 227)”whether an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally connected is assignable for it”

(citing at note 27 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall, at 319, 18 L. Ed. 356; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S., at 96-97, 78 S. Ct. at 595-596; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S., at 615, 617, 80 S. Ct.,at 1375,1376); “and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned” (citing at note 28 Cunnings v. Missouri, 4 Wall at 318, 18 L. Ed. 356: Helwig v. Untied States, 188 U.S. at 613, 23 S. Ct. at 429; Untied States v. Costatine, 296 U.S., at 295, 56 S. Ct., 227; Rex Trailer Co. v. Untied States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S. Ct. 219, 222, 100 L. Ed. 149. But of Child labor Tax Case, 259 U.S., at 41, 42 S. Ct.,at 452; Fleming v. Nestor, at 614, 616 and n. 9, 80 S. Ct., 1374,1375).

(21) The foregoing criteria are especially informative in considering the instant case. Certainly, the dire consequence of losing custody of one’s child for yours or, perhaps permanently is plainly an “affirmative disability or restraint”. So also is the prospect of being subjected to the supervision of a probation officer (W&I 360). The parents and children may suffer the probation officers of juvenile court’s control for, possibly, twenty-one years (W&I 303; W&I245.5). such control is virtually unlimited and the court may even order a parent out of his/her own home indefinitely. Forcing parents to submit to and pay for “treatment” is plainly an “affirmative disability and restraint”.

Such forced “treatment” can cost tens of thousands of dollars (W&I 361.5 (a); W&I362 (a),(b),(c),(d)). Refusal of the parents to submit to such “treatment” may result in the permanent loss of their child (W&I 364(c); W&I 366.21(e)). These are serious restraints upon the child, parents, and family.

(21) “(M)ost parents would view the loss of custody ( of their child) as dire punishment” : Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal App. 3d 895, 901 (97 Cal. Rptr. 158). The California Appellate court here recognizes the natural and inevitable effect that loss of child custody has upon most parents. Such a loss will be viewed as very serious indeed, perhaps far more punitive than imprisonment. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:

Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties. Even the convict committed to prison and thereby deprived of his physical liberty often retains the love and support of family members. Santoskly v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 787

(21) Examination of the W&I 300 reveals that its provisions come into play only upon a finding of “scienter”, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra at 567, and that it is the mens rea and the actus reus of the parent that the juvenile court will judge.

The acts of omissions proscribed by W&I 300 are malum in se and:

Inquiry into whether the offense is morally offensive and malum in se or merely malum prohibition is one factor often employed in determining whether an offense is petty. United States v. Arbo, 69 F. 2d 862 at 864 (9^th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).

If an offense is serious, that is, malum in se, the accused is entitled to a trial by jury, as a matter of right under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the Untied States of America. District of Columbia v Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1987); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 67(1930); Untied States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F. 2d 461, 464 (9^th Cir. 1967). It is obvious that the provisions of W&I 300 “promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"” Kennedy v. mendoza-Martinez, Supra at 567. The “dire consequences”. The penance, payment or retribution that may be exacted upon the parent can involve the child, property, and liberty of the parent.

(21) Additionally, a studied consideration of many of the subsections of the W&I 300 reveals that “the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra at 567. Thus, W&I 300 (b) corresponds to California Penal Code (hereafter noted as C.P.C.) 270: W&I 300 (d) corresponds to C.P.C. 11165 (b); W&I 300(j) corresponds to C.P.C.273a(1) NS (2), C.P.C.273(d), and C.P.C. 11165(b).